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THE QUESTION-AND-ANSWER LOGIC OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Quentin Skinner has enduringly insisted that a past text cannot be ‘understood’ 
without the reader knowing something about its historical and linguistic context. 
But since the 1970s he has been attacked on this central point of all his work by 
authors maintaining that the text itself is the fundamental guide to the author’s 
intention, and that a separate study of the context cannot tell the historian 
anything that the text itself could not. Mark Bevir has spent much of the last 
twenty years repeating a similar counter-argument. Although ‘study the linguistic 
context’ might be a useful heuristic maxim, Bevir says, it does not express a 
necessary or sufficient condition for understanding. But Skinner is right, and 
one of the figures he has consistently identified as a formative inspiration, R. G. 
Collingwood, has already (in his work of the 1930s) shown why. What 
Collingwood calls his ‘logic of question and answer’ explains why the historian 
cannot answer his characteristic ‘intention’ question about past texts without 
knowing the context of problems to which authors think they are offering 
solutions. The study of context is neither ‘prior’ (as Bevir incorrectly supposes) 
nor ‘separate’ (as Skinner inaccurately says), but it is, as Skinner maintains, 
nevertheless impossible to grasp an author’s intention without it. This ‘logic of 
question and answer’ also explains why, in history, dismissing the study of 
context is in fact a prejudgement of evidence yet unseen. 
 
Key words history of ideas, methodology, context, Quentin Skinner, R. G. 
Collingwood 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Context and its critics 
 
For Quentin Skinner, understanding a text means knowing what an author 
thought he was ‘doing’ with it, and in it, and in order to know what he was ‘doing’ it is 
necessary, Skinner says, to know something of the situation in which he saw himself – 
the ‘context’ without which the author’s intentions make no sense (1969: 48-9). We 
might be able to understand something about what an author thought he was doing by 
examining a text in isolation but, unless we consider the relevant features of the text’s 
context, we cannot grasp what he was doing. Our understanding of that text, in short, 
will be impoverished. 
This ‘contextualism’ came under instant fire in the early 1970s in articles by 
literary theorists such as Anthony Savile and S. H. Olsen1 (Skinner, 1975: 217). These 
critics maintained that the fundamental guide to an author’s intentions in writing is 
provided by the text itself – or at least that is how historians of ideas ought to approach 
texts. A separate study of an author’s context, such as Skinner insists upon, cannot, they 
say, enable the historian to understand anything of the text which he could not get from 
studying the text itself. 
Mark Bevir has spent much of the last twenty years also trying ‘to counter the 
claim that historians must study the linguistic context of a text if they are to recover the 
meaning of that text’ (Bevir, 1992: 278), and his most focused attack on what he used to 
call ‘soft linguistic contextualists’ – whom he has now re-branded ‘conventionalists’, and 
recently decided are a breed of ‘modernists’ (2009) – is to be found in ‘The Errors of 
Linguistic Contextualism’ of 1992.2 For Bevir, Skinner’s insistence that historians must 
study context (rather than that they may) is logically invalid. Although ‘study the linguistic 
context of an utterance’ is a ‘useful heuristic maxim’, doing so ‘is not necessary or 
 
 
 
sufficient for understanding’ (2000: 395; 1992: 276). Understanding, he adds, ‘does not 
presuppose prior knowledge of the relevant linguistic context’, and in fact ‘there is no 
definite procedure that historians must follow in order to recover intentions’ (1992: 297). 
Skinner is therefore wrong, Bevir thinks, to present his ‘methods as logics of discovery’ – 
pre-requisites of understanding or knowledge – because ‘no method can be a prerequisite 
of good history whether it be contextualism, conventionalism, or something else’ (2000: 
399). 
Skinner is saying (Bevir thinks) – in fact, ‘soft linguistic contextualists’ ‘insist’ 
(1992: 290) – that historians can understand a text only if they can approach it with a 
correct ‘prior theory’ of those background conventions supposedly used by the author 
(1992: 288-9). Bevir then objects that sometimes people express themselves 
unconventionally, and we can understand them even though we can have no ‘prior 
knowledge’ of their conventions. In his example of Mrs Malaprop’s ‘nice derangement of 
epitaphs’, the speaker makes herself ridiculous precisely because she gets conventional 
language use wrong – yet we understand her meaning perfectly well. ‘We regularly 
surmise the meaning of unfamiliar phrases’, Bevir points out, so ‘it cannot be necessary 
for understanding that intentions should be expressed conventionally, let alone that 
speaker and listener should have common prior theories’ (1992: 290). 
The truth is, Bevir concludes, that we understand utterances thanks not to ‘prior 
theories’, but to ‘passing theories’ – a ‘crucial distinction’.3 Because ‘soft linguistic 
contextualists’ insist on ‘prior theories’, their accounts of interpretation are ‘mechanical’. 
But if we accept the importance of only ‘passing theories’, we accept also that 
‘understanding is a creative process in which we can compensate for any disparity 
between the meaning of a text and the prior theory we bring to that text by a leap of 
understanding that results in a correct passing theory’ (1992: 290). Historians then… 
 
 
 
 
might be able to comprehend texts even if they do not approach them with 
knowledge of the precise conventions in terms of which the authors 
communicated their intentions; and, if historians can come to understand a text 
even when they have a faulty view of the conventions that apply to that text, 
then clearly they need not necessarily study the linguistic context of texts (1992: 
290). 
 
Furthermore, Bevir adds, it cannot even be necessary to know the context of the 
arguments that ‘contextualists’ also insist upon, because authors are not ‘always out to 
contribute to contemporary arguments’ (his example is Annie Besant’s Four Great 
Religions). So whether they are writing without reference to other texts, or whether they 
are openly and explicitly responding to other texts, in neither case is it necessary ‘to 
locate the text within a linguistic context in order to secure uptake of the author’s 
intention in writing that text’ (1992: 291). We can sometimes understand an author’s 
intention in writing a text, Bevir concludes, even though we know nothing of the 
contemporary context. 
Thus Bevir’s critique. There is, though, a fundamental sense in which knowledge 
of the context is not only a ‘prerequisite’ for understanding, or a mere ‘heuristic maxim’ 
as Bevir thinks it is: it is actually inherent to knowing what an author thought he was 
saying in a text and what he thought he was doing by writing it and distributing it in the 
first place. Without knowing something of the ‘context’ in the sense I intend by this, no 
utterance can be understood: Annie Besant’s Four Great Religions would be a complete 
mystery to historians of ideas, and Mrs Malaprop’s lexical blunders would be not only 
meaningless, but also (which is worse) they would not even be funny. 
What I have delineated below is an argument in support of Skinner’s basic point 
derived from two arguments made by R. G. Collingwood, both in relation to what he 
 
 
 
calls his ‘logic of question and answer’. Two of Collingwood’s ‘question and answer’ 
arguments come into play here: the first, which we will come to in part III, is a question-
and-answer theory of historical understanding. The second, which we will come to in 
part V, is a question-and-answer theory of historical method. In view of both facets of 
Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’ Bevir’s criticisms are undercut, while 
Skinner’s claims, it seems to me, remain standing. 
 
 
II. Skinner and Collingwood 
 
But before we go into Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, it is well to 
say something about Skinner’s invocation of Collingwood hitherto. Skinner has 
conspicuously not mobilized for his own gain the arguments of Collingwood’s that I am 
about to revive, even in his 2001 article about ‘a Collingwoodian approach to the history 
of political thought’. This is partly, of course, because Skinner prefers to do his own 
thinking for himself (precisely as Collingwood instructs); but I think it is also because he 
does not recognize that he shares with Collingwood more than a handful of basic 
positions. In fact, Skinner sometimes signals certain disjunctions from Collingwood that 
are not really there. For example, although he says historians must, concerning the 
authors they are studying, ‘use the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry to grasp their 
concepts, to follow their distinctions, to appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to 
see things their way’, (2002: 120) he also rejects Collingwood’s ‘doctrine of re-enactment’. 
In Skinner’s view ‘Stepping empathetically into other people’s shoes and attempting (in 
R. G. Collingwood’s unfortunate phrase) to think thoughts after them’ is a ‘discredited 
hermeneutic ambition’ – and he even repeats the old commonplace that this ‘empathetic 
process’ of ‘old-fashioned hermeneutics’ is ‘mysterious’ (2002: 3). 
 
 
 
Regarding historical context specifically, Collingwood seems at first blanch to 
offer Skinner very little, and I am sure Skinner has not failed to notice this. 
Collingwood’s Autobiography says nothing about ‘context’, and although he does discuss it 
in his Idea of History, he actually appears openly hostile to it. Here are two passages from 
that text which a critic sympathetic to Collingwood could even level against Skinner: 
 
It has been said that anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and 
falsified; and that, in consequence, to know any one thing, we must know its 
context, which implies knowing the whole universe. I do not propose to discuss 
this doctrine in its whole bearing, but only to remind the reader of its connexion 
with the view that reality is immediate experience, and its corollary that thought, 
which inevitably tears things out of their context, can never be true. On such a 
doctrine Euclid’s act of thinking on a given occasion that these angles are equal 
would be what it was only in relation to the total context of his then experience, 
including such things as his being in a good temper and having a slave standing 
behind his right shoulder (1993: 298). 
 
Five pages later Collingwood makes a different but related point: 
 
[E]ven thought, in its immediacy as the unique act of thought with its unique 
context in the life of an individual thinker, is not the object of historical 
knowledge. It cannot be re-enacted; if it could, time itself would be cancelled 
and the historian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over again 
in all respects the same. The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of 
thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened (1993: 303). 
 
 
 
 
On the matter of context, then, there would appear to be a significant divergence 
between these two authors. It is obvious how one might use these apparently anti-
contextual sentiments to undermine Skinner’s claim to Collingwood’s legacy, or even to 
attack his claims about the importance of understanding through context outright. But it 
is not obvious how Collingwood might actually support ‘contextualism’. 
Firstly it would be a mistake to think that Collingwood is attacking in these 
passages ‘context’ in something like the form appealed to by Skinner. The kind of 
context Collingwood rejects the need for is the ‘re-experiencing’ of the author’s context, 
that is, the experiential context: the feelings the author had at the time of writing, the light 
by which he wrote, the pen in hand, or – as here – the slave standing behind his 
shoulder. None of this is relevant to historical understanding, for Collingwood, because 
although this kind of context is part of the author’s situation ‘as he sees it,’ it is not the 
situation pertaining to the problem or question he is trying to solve or answer. Two 
people do not need to share an experiential context in order to think the same thoughts – 
the same noemata.4 
But secondly, and more importantly, context is, for Collingwood, not only 
relevant to understanding, but integral to it when what is meant by ‘context’ is (a) the 
terms of the problem the author saw himself as facing, and/or (b) the medium of 
expressing the solution. 
 
III. Context I: questions and problems 
 
No work of philosophy, Collingwood says, can be understood until the reader 
knows the question to which the text is intended as an answer (1939: 31; 55).5 ‘Knowing’ 
the actor’s context in this sense – that is, as the relevant features pertaining to the problem 
– is part of what it means to see the agent’s situation as he himself saw it (1939: 58). 
 
 
 
Here is how Collingwood explains, in his Autobiography, how he discovered this 
principle, and how he put it to use teaching the history of philosophy at Oxford. (I have 
provided it at length because all previous attempts to paraphrase it more succinctly have 
failed): 
  
I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by 
simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or 
written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In 
order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a 
question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the 
thing he has said or written was meant as an answer… 
Now, the question ‘To what question did So-and-so intend this 
proposition for an answer?’ is an historical question, and therefore cannot be 
settled except by historical methods. When So-and-so wrote in a distant past, it 
is generally a very difficult one, because writers (at any rate good writers) always 
write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are ‘likely to be 
interested’, which means those who are already asking the question to which an 
answer is being offered; and consequently a writer very seldom explains what 
the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a 
‘classic’ and his contemporaries are all long dead, the question has been 
forgotten; especially if the answer he gave was generally acknowledged to be the 
right answer; for in that case people stopped asking the question, and began 
asking the question that next arose. So the question asked by the original writer 
can only be reconstructed historically, often not without the exercise of 
considerable skill (1939: 31-9). 
 
For works of philosophy the concept of a ‘question’ is more or less self-
explanatory. For the actions of architects or of naval strategists, though (Collingwood’s 
 
 
 
examples – 1939: 29; 58) – or of the kinds of rhetorical performers about whom Skinner 
writes – we should take Collingwood’s ‘questions’ more comprehensively, as ‘problems’, 
the ‘situation’ in which intervention is thought by the agent to be desirable.  
‘Questions’ and ‘problems’ are by no means simple. ‘A highly detailed and 
particularized proposition must be the answer,’ Collingwood adds, ‘not to a vague and 
generalized question, but to a question as detailed and particularized as itself’ (1939: 32). 
Collingwood calls this his ‘principle of correlativity’. In order to understand Nelson’s 
orders at the Battle of Trafalgar, for instance, the naval historian has to grasp the terms 
of Nelson’s problem much more sophisticatedly than would be implied by saying that his 
problem was ‘Villeneuve’ – or, more essentially still, ‘Napoleon’. Indeed, in order to 
‘understand’ any single manoeuvre executed during that battle we have to see the 
correlative ‘problem’ to which it was a solution, and in as much logical, logistical detail as 
the captain responsible for solving it would have seen it. The same goes for Hobbes, 
whose context in this sense is far more than ‘the Civil War’. Hobbes’ ‘question’ would in 
fact require for its explication a work at least as detailed and particularized as the 
Leviathan itself (and, I suspect, that several times over). Hobbes’s complex problem 
‘arises’, in Collingwood’s term (1939: 37), out of the ‘situation’ of his social and political 
milieu, his private readings and conversations, perhaps also private feuds over some 
point or other that he wanted to settle along the way, and so on. Each might add ‘terms’ 
to the problem that Leviathan is meant to solve, and each is potentially historically 
investigable. Skinner’s own Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes is meant to show, 
for example, that part of the ‘problem’ to which Leviathan is a solution is the problem of 
reason alone being deficient for demonstrating truth to readers (Skinner 1996: 2-4). The 
rhetorical eloquence of Leviathan is, Skinner shows, partly a solution to this problem. This 
therefore indicates a more basic problem in Hobbes’s mind, which there is no real need 
for him to explicate: namely, ‘at present, not enough people recognise certain important 
 
 
 
political truths’ – truths, that is, of scientia civilis. Perhaps the more ‘historically remote’ a 
problem becomes, the more work historians have to do to explain to their readers all the 
important ways in which the terms of that question differ from what they might have 
assumed. (Many of my students initially assume Hobbes’s question to be ‘what is the 
ideal state?’) This is one reason why historians of ideas never, in fact, seek to ‘understand’ 
a text in its entirety. The notion that they do this is something of a dummy premise in 
‘methodological’ arguments. They try rather to answer much more specific questions 
about a specific aspect of a text or an author’s work more widely. 
The point is that studying the ‘context’ in this sense is more than a mere 
‘heuristic maxim’, because it is a necessary condition of understanding a solution that one 
know something, and perhaps that one know rather a lot, about the problem to which it 
is intended as a solution. It is a necessary condition because when it is eschewed – that is, 
when one does not know the question – one does not understand its solution. 
Bevir thinks that if an author is writing with another particular author in mind – 
against him, in support of him, or whatever – then he will usually say so explicitly, and 
there is therefore no need for Skinner’s separate study or prior theories (1992: 291). 
Paying renewed attention to Collingwood can remind Bevir that there are always terms of 
an author’s ‘questions’ that authors simply assume their readers will share. Indeed it 
might not even have occurred to them that it is possible to live in this world without 
assuming the very things they therefore quite reasonably leave unsaid. The historian, 
then, cannot rely on his authors to be explicit about even the most fundamental terms of 
their questions. Collingwood’s principle of the agent’s ‘problem’ also provides us with a 
good way of distinguishing between what of the writer’s ‘context’ is not relevant to 
understanding his utterance, and what is integral to it: namely, if it comprises a term of 
the author’s question, then it is integral to understanding his proposed answer. 
 
 
 
But even if this is right, is it how Skinner uses ‘context’? Although Bevir clearly 
does not, does Skinner mean by ‘context’ something like ‘problem’? It seems to me that 
there is a question-and-answer logic to Skinner’s view of history, to ‘seeing things their 
way’, and always has been. My search among Skinner’s published writings has so far 
produced no evidence that he contradicts this question-and-answer account of ‘context’. 
The arguments Bevir mostly takes issue with are from Skinner’s 1972 article for New 
Literary History, ‘Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts’. It is also these 
arguments that, out of almost all of Skinner’s, need the most extensive disentanglement 
in order to show how they too cohere with the logic of question and answer. The 
entanglement is in the word ‘intention’ which Skinner uses throughout. What Skinner 
does not say is that an intention itself has what we could call a problem and solution 
‘structure’: formally the ‘intention’ is always to ‘solve’. Again it is self-explanatory what 
this means regarding a ‘question’ – it is to ‘state the answer’. But naval commanders, 
architects and rhetoricians ‘solve’ in a more general sense. Their ‘problems’, their 
‘difficulties’, are things like large French fleets likely to invade their homeland if allowed 
to resupply at Naples; or a queen and public that expects a grand but sombre memorial 
to a world-class statesman, and a competition to be the man who designed it; or, for 
parliamentarians and rhetoricians, an audience or populace that needs to have its mind 
changed about something. 
When Skinner suggests that historians as a rule should focus ‘on the prevailing 
conventions governing the treatment of the issues or themes with which that text is 
concerned’ (1972: 406), he is recommending simultaneously something about the study 
of questions and something about the study of answers. Concerning questions, the 
historian should be eliminating through such a study questions (or particular terms of a 
question) that the given author probably did not see himself facing. He might also find 
through such a study that his author most likely thought he was answering something 
 
 
 
else that was commonly dealt with according to the conventions of his environment, and 
which makes sense of a passage which otherwise seems to contribute nothing to the 
answer as it was previously understood. The motives and intentions Skinner distinguishes 
in ‘Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts’ are both terms of the author’s 
‘problem’, though the particular kind of term is precisely what the distinction clarifies. 
And concerning solutions, the study of conventions might yield evidence that the 
author deals with a question the way he does because most authors in this period thought 
that this (whatever it is) was the right way to go about solving this kind of question. 
My search for consistencies between Skinner and Collingwood on a question-
and-answer form of ‘context’ has on the contrary yielded more than I can reproduce 
here, and it goes right back to Skinner’s seminal 1969 article for History and Theory, 
‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’. The common errors among 
historians of ideas which he describes there are, after all, simply sub-species of attributing 
the wrong questions to authors’ proposed solutions: supposedly perennial questions, the 
historian’s own questions, questions which only later rose to significance (‘prolepsis’), 
etc. Moreover, the prefaces to his series The Foundations of Modern Political Thought contain 
explicit statements that we must see authors’ problems as they saw them. ‘In order to see 
them [texts] as answers to specific questions’, he says, ‘we need to know something about 
the society in which they were written’ (Skinner, 1978: xiii). After all, ‘political life itself 
sets the main problems for the political theorist’ (Skinner, 1978: xi). 
So Skinner is consistent with Collingwood’s ‘context’ principle of ‘knowing the 
question’ – or at least there is no evidence in his writing that he is inconsistent with it. 
Collingwood’s insistence on the necessary condition of knowing the ‘question’ context of 
an utterance, text, or action, which shows why Bevir is wrong, therefore also vindicates 
Skinner. 
 
 
 
But it seems to me moreover that Skinner does not really intend anything 
fundamentally extra by ‘context’ than what necessarily pertains to ‘question and answer’. 
There is one obvious objection likely to be made to this: There is a prevalence of 
philosophy of language in Skinner of a kind that seems to be absent or different in 
Collingwood. Surely this, one might think, goes beyond Collingwood’s account of 
historical understanding? 
 
 
IV. Context II: language as a medium 
 
Skinner is concerned with the linguistic context of an action, which Collingwood is 
not, and it is this more than anything that makes it look as though new, ‘linguistic’ 
hermeneutics is supposed to have superseded old or ‘classical’ hermeneutics.6 For 
Skinner, I think, the post-Collingwood advances in philosophy of language, chiefly of J. 
L. Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein and H. P. Grice, have rendered much of the ‘old-
fashioned’ hermeneutics obsolete – elements such as ‘re-enactment’. It is from these 
authors rather than from Collingwood that Skinner says he takes many of his arguments 
and concepts. 
But this ‘difference’ introduced by philosophy of language does not impact upon 
the Collingwoodian foundation of Skinner’s argument about context: Skinner has simply 
coloured in some of the spaces left by Collingwood by providing an analysis of language 
as the medium through which the author expresses his intentions in order to solve the 
problem(s) he faces. The kind of analysis of the political language and discourse of a time 
Skinner advocates is supposed to provide better, more accurate, and more sophisticated 
historical knowledge of what agents thought they were doing because, firstly, some of the 
terms of an author’s ‘problem’ will always be to do with words and terminology. 
 
 
 
Something of the linguistic context in which an author operates is always integral to the 
problem he thinks he is trying to solve. But it is also – and this is the emphasis Skinner 
puts on studying linguistic contexts – because terminological and rhetorical conventions 
are relevant aspects of the medium through which the agent ‘solves’. That is to say, if 
part of the view the actor has of his situation is certain beliefs about what his medium of 
expression (his ‘language’) allows or constraints him to do in order to successfully solve 
his problem – and if those beliefs would help the historian to answer his question about 
what the actor thought he was doing, or why he chose to express himself in this way or 
in that – then those beliefs must be known to the historian. 
Skinner thinks this methodological focus on the conventions and social context 
would be a more ‘holistic’ approach for the historian to take than for him to focus only 
on ‘the individual action’ (2002: 142) – which might be another attempt to signal a 
disjunction from Collingwood. But it seems that all he is really saying is that the language 
the agent has at his disposal must also be reconstructed and seen ‘from the inside’7 in 
order to form conclusions about ‘intentions’. Thus, on both the ‘question’ and the 
‘answer’ sides of understanding texts, the kind of context Skinner is talking about is the 
kind of context that is integral to understanding even in Collingwoodian terms. 
This does not mean, as Bevir thinks it does, that historians should always carry 
out a prior study of context in order to develop a ‘prior theory’ to take with them to the 
reading of a given text. (I will explain what is wrong with this ‘prior theory’ reading 
below.) It means rather something else: the ‘intention’ questions that historians of ideas 
have about the texts they are studying cannot be answered without consulting something 
called ‘context’. As we have seen this means simply something integral to the problem as 
the given author saw it, or something integral to the means of solution he thought he had 
at his disposal. Nothing else needs to be studied. But then, by ‘context’ Skinner does not 
mean anything more. 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Context and evidence 
 
Let us grant that the ‘context’ of a text, in the basic question-and-answer sense I 
have just outlined, might be fully comprehensible from studying only the text itself; and 
let us grant that there really are such texts: they were intended by the author to be fully 
understandable on their own terms, and more or less are. Do historians, then, ever need 
to study anything but the text itself, or should they, as Savile and Olsen insisted in their 
ripostes to Skinner in the 1970s, treat all texts as the works of authors who ought to have 
written everything into them that would be required for their correct interpretation? 
This question can be very easily solved – or actually, I think, dissolved – by 
remembering a second facet of Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’, discussed 
in its fundamental aspect in chapter five of his Autobiography. Good historical method, 
like all other good scientific method, begins always with a question, Collinwood writes; 
and in order to answer their questions historians must use evidence, which is subtly 
different from what were traditionally called ‘sources’. ‘Anything is evidence which can 
be used as evidence,’ Collingwood writes in The Principles of History, ‘and no one can tell 
what is going to serve him as evidence for answering a certain question until he has 
formulated the question’ (2001: 38). 
What ‘Skinnerite’ historians want to know is what their authors thought they 
were doing when they wrote their texts. That is the question they bring to their studies, 
and there are few who would be willing to say that it is an illegitimate question for an 
historian of ideas to attempt to answer. In order to construct conclusions to a question 
like this, the historian has to use evidence. This is what Collingwood means as well, when 
he writes in his Autobiography that ‘the question ‘To what question did So-and-so intend 
 
 
 
this proposition for an answer?’ is an historical question, and therefore cannot be settled 
except by historical methods’ (1939: 39). 
The text itself is obviously part of that evidence, and usually the first port of call. 
But to prejudge it as the only evidence relevant to constructing an answer, without finding 
out what other evidence there might be among what Skinner calls a ‘range of extratextual 
aids’ (Skinner 1975: 228) that could help to refine the historian’s conclusion, could only 
be considered bad history. Yet this is what it actually means to disregard ‘context’ in this 
slightly different sense of ‘what is going on around the text’ or ‘outside’ the text: it is to 
prejudge evidence yet unseen. Skinner concedes that there are some texts that are 
‘autonomous,’ and might contain everything that the historian needs to understand the 
author’s intentions. But this is only to say that evidence useful to answering that question 
outside of what is offered wholly within the text is yet to be found. He points out, 
obviously rightly, that nothing is to be gained from assuming this that is not already 
covered by a contextual approach, which makes sure that such an assumption is correct. 
This is because the study of ‘context’ that Skinner is appealing to, as the historian 
encounters it, is not the study of a fundamentally different kind of evidence – it is just 
looking for more evidence potentially able to help the historian answer his question. The 
mistake Skinner’s targets are making is sticking with the obsolete historian’s distinction 
between ‘primary’ sources and ‘secondary’ sources. As Collingwood rightly points out in 
The Principles of History, the court of truth in history is other historians, who compare 
one’s constructions with all available evidence,8 and no longer make such a distinction. It 
is, then, quite clear what is lost by those historians who disregard extra-textual evidence, 
or consider it ‘secondary’, but not at all clear what they gain, other than the increased risk 
that other historians can easily find evidence to falsify their conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. The errors of Bevir’s critique 
 
This second facet of Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, in conjunction 
with the first, shows what has gone wrong with Bevir’s criticisms of Skinner’s claims 
about context. In short, it seems that Bevir has got the real process of actual historians’ 
work back-to-front, because he has mistaken the question-and-answer, investigative 
process of historians for a process in which, when it is done properly, concepts are to be 
related ‘logically’ in a sense more abstracted from how historians go about answering 
their questions. He therefore views the process of interpretation from a ‘logical’ point of 
view, rather than from a ‘practical’ one of question and answer, and seeks to point to 
logical leaks in the conceptual dyke. 
This is not to say that what historians do is illogical, or that logic is an illegitimate 
weapon against Skinner’s arguments. All I mean is that when Skinner’s description of a 
procedure in good historical work is converted into a logical series and translated back 
into a set of practical instructions, it does indeed begin to look very strange. 
When Skinner says that it is a necessary condition of answering a question of 
intention that one first ‘study’ the conventions of a time, he is not saying that historians, 
to do their work properly, begin with a complete and quite separate study of those 
conventions in order to produce a body of knowledge which can then be taken to the 
‘reading’ table, as one might prepare a body of notes before an important negotiation. 
This though is Bevir’s version of Skinner’s methodological prescription. When Skinner 
advises a study of the prevailing conventions, he is calling, in Bevir’s view, for the 
formulation of a ‘prior theory that covers the conventions in terms of which the author 
expressed his illocutionary intentions in writing that text’ (1992: 289). This ‘prior theory’ 
is, then, something like an historian’s substitute for the ‘socio-cultural background’ he 
cannot otherwise share with the subjects of his study. This principle of Bevir’s – that 
 
 
 
‘Any putative logic of discovery must rest, explicitly or implicitly, on the assumption that 
to understand an utterance we need to hold a correct prior theory’ (2000: 399) – leads 
him into a further diversionary distinction between ‘prior theories’ and ‘passing theories.’ 
This insistence on ‘prior theories’ Bevir sees as the hallmark of any ‘specific method’, 
which is why none are actually necessary. (He repeats the image of ‘prior knowledge’ in 
2000: 399). 
Of course, Bevir defeats this instruction to bring a ‘prior theory’ (rather than a 
‘passing theory’) to the reading of a text. But it is not Skinner’s anyway, because the 
‘study of context’ is not supposed to produce, as Bevir reads, a ‘body of knowledge’ 
(1992: 289), a substitute socio-cultural background for the historian’s reading. It is rather 
– and this is all Skinner means – that the historian’s investigation of context leads from 
his question about what an utterance means to some idea about what the author’s 
question or problem was. This is because his first question about an utterance, necessary 
to ‘understanding’ in the sense in which he pursues it, is ‘What is this an answer to?’ or, 
‘What was this supposed to solve?’ A study aimed at elucidating the question in sufficient 
detail is a study of context, but it cannot take place before the historian has even 
formulated his question. Skinner’s only mistake is inaccurately calling the study of 
context a ‘separate form of study’. It is not separate at all: it serves the historian’s original 
question. Indeed he acknowledges this too in volume one of his Foundations: ‘When we 
attempt in this way to locate a text within its appropriate context, we are not merely 
providing historical ‘background’ for our interpretation; we are already engaged in the act 
of interpretation itself’ (1978: xiv). 
Bevir might, if he wishes, call the answer to the ‘question’ question itself a ‘prior 
theory’, as indeed it is: it is the historian’s theory about what the author’s question was. 
But calling it such will only serve to yield an important exception to his rule about ‘prior 
theories’ never being necessary. Indeed, it shows that such a theory is necessary in the 
 
 
 
even stronger sense that it is unavoidable. In reading a text one always assumes, whether 
consciously or not, the question to which it is an answer. This ‘studying’ and ‘theorizing’ 
is inevitable as part of what ‘reading’ is, but it can be done well or badly. It is done well 
when it is done deliberately and investigatively, studying as much evidence as is necessary 
to find the best answer. It is done badly when done unreflectively, perhaps even 
unconsciously, with the text itself constituting the full body of ‘evidence’ studied by the 
reader, the historian, and even then not terribly thoroughly. My point is not that in order 
to understand anything one must perform this kind of study as thoroughly as possible 
every time. It is rather my intention to explain why, where attempts to ‘understand’ are 
concerned, Bevir is wrong to think that this ‘study’ and its ‘theory’ can ever be bypassed 
at all. 
When Bevir does turn his discussion to the ‘historical’ process of question-
evidence-answer, he is forced to concede that the context can be useful for understanding 
a text. Indeed, he is prepared to give a lot of ground here: 
 
The linguistic context might even provide a crucial piece of evidence that will 
lead a historian to see the meaning of a particular text. Further, there is a sense 
in which the fact that the linguistic context might provide a crucial piece of 
evidence means that prudent historians always will examine the linguistic 
context of texts that interest them (1992: 293-4). 
 
But Bevir is only prepared to give this ground because he thinks he has kept the 
process of historical work, where historians are prudent and evidence is ‘useful’, separate 
from the logical process in which ‘necessary conditions’ are to be discussed. This is 
because (aptly enough) the question to which his ‘methodological’ writing is an answer is 
quite different to that tackled by Skinner. It is clear from his 1999 work, The Logic of the 
 
 
 
History of Ideas, exactly how Bevir’s ‘problem’ differs from that of Skinner – and perhaps 
always has differed. One of the assumptions built into the ‘problem’ common to all of 
Skinner’s writings is that we are discussing the procedures by which historians of ideas 
answer their questions – that is, do their work. Bevir does not really share this, because 
one of the assumptions that defines the problem common to all of his work is that ‘the 
history of ideas’ as a discipline is to be corrected by analysing and defining the concepts 
used in methodological debates, with the results providing ‘normative’ definitions for 
scholars (Bevir, 1999: 9, 10, 16).  In the case of the concept of ‘context’ however, this 
framing of the question has not served Bevir well, because he finds himself describing 
and attacking something that would form neither a necessary nor even a useful part of any 
historian’s procedure: namely, the task of studying an amorphous network of meanings, 
ideas, assumptions, conventions, and words, with no specific idea of what kind of 
evidence it is that is being sought amongst it all. It would lead to something Skinner, in 
his work on Hobbes, explicitly warns historians against: drowning an author ‘in an ocean 
of discourse’ (1996: 8). 
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
Our conclusions from all this fall into two sets: those conclusions concerning the 
present, and those concerning the past. Those concerning the present are that, firstly, 
studying the historical context is a necessary condition of understanding, when (a) what 
the historian wants to ‘understand’ is what the author thought he was doing in and with a 
text, and when (b) ‘context’ includes either or both of the terms of the problem he thought 
he faced, and/or the medium he thought he had at his disposal for solving it. Secondly, the 
study of what is ‘outside’ the text is no more or less legitimate or useful per se than the 
 
 
 
study of the text itself, because, for the historian with a question to answer, there is no 
meaningful distinction to be made between different types of evidence. 
A third conclusion we can add is that, if his treatment of ‘context’ is 
representative, Bevir’s failure to think in the question-and-answer terms of Collingwood’s 
historian with questions to answer is a severe compromise to the efficacy and purport of 
his writings concerning the history of ideas. On ‘context’ he has been consistently misled 
by the term ‘prior theory’ and by the notion of the ‘separate study’ which is thought to 
produce it. This mistake can only be made if we lose sight of the actual investigative 
character of what historians of ideas do – or, at least, should do – and attempt to 
substitute for methodology analyses of conceptual logic and resultant normative 
conceptual definitions. In contrast, it is a virtue of Skinner’s writings on historical 
method that they, like Collingwood’s, are never considered and composed except from 
this point of view. It is to be admitted, though, that Skinner’s own language has invited 
rather too literal an interpretation of his ‘priority’ metaphor: that ‘before’ you might read, 
you must study ‘context’. 
The second set of conclusions, those regarding ‘the past’, are as follows. I have 
not argued that all of Skinner’s arguments about method or about the importance to 
studying ‘context’ are secretly based on Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’. But 
we can conclude that Skinner is in agreement with Collingwood on points directly 
concerning his claims about the necessity for understanding a past text of understanding 
historical context. We can also conclude that this agreement has generally not been 
recognized – perhaps even by Skinner himself – and that this is probably partly because 
of Collingwood’s own dismissal of a version of ‘knowing-in-context’ (a false version) 
according to which ‘context’ means the lives, experiences, and mental worlds of 
individual thinkers. But when false definitions of ‘context’ are stripped away, and when 
we refocus on what historians of ideas ask about texts and how they go about answering 
 
 
 
those questions, it becomes clear that – as Collingwood always wrote, and as Skinner has 
always maintained – the historical context of texts has, just like the work of prudent 
historians themselves, a question-and-answer logic. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1 Savile, Anthony (1972) ‘The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art’, in Harold 
Osborne (ed.) Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158-76. (Skinner points 
particularly to pp. 170-1.) See Skinner, 1974: 217. Olsen, Stein Hangom (1973) ‘Authorial 
Intention’, British Journal of Aesthetics 13: 219-31. Skinner points particularly to p. 229. 
2 His argument in ‘The Role of Contexts in Understanding and Explanation’ eight years 
later is broadly the same, and the chapter on ‘Meaning’ in his Logic of the History of Ideas is 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
obviously another revised version of the same thing. A later piece meanwhile, 
‘Contextualism: From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Historicism?’, replaces 
argument with a loaded quasi-historical story of how such ‘modernist ambitions’ have 
been ‘eroded’ and how ‘modernist method’ has ‘lost plausibility’ (2009: 221-222). The 
question there is ‘what shall we do now?’ 
3 The distinction is repeated (and so is the Mrs Malaprop example) in Bevir, 2000: 399. 
4 For this usage see Collingwood, 2001: 223. See also van der Dussen’s introduction to 
Collingwood, 1993: xxxvii. 
5 The notion goes right back to Collingwood’s first published book, Religion and Philosophy, 
of 1916. See Collingwood, 1997: 42-3. 
6 See for instance Lamb, 2009: 8. 
7 …as must all of the things Charles Taylor asks Skinner about in his insouciant chapter 
in Meaning and Context. Taylor writes: ‘The challenge here as it relates to Skinner’s 
methodology could be put in this way: telling us to identify what the author of a text is 
doing, how he is intervening in the conflicts of his day, is not enough. We can’t take it 
for granted that we already know how to do this for an age sufficiently different from 
our own. Perhaps we need to learn more about the kinds of conflicts that were, what was 
at stake in them, the kinds of moves you could make, and what represented victory or 
defeat.’ See Taylor, 1988: 226-7. 
8 In The Idea of History Collingwood writes: ‘the historian’s picture stands in a peculiar 
relation to something called evidence. The only way in which the historian or any one 
else can judge, even tentatively, of its truth is by considering this relation; and, in practice, 
what we mean by asking whether an historical statement is true is whether it can be 
justified by an appeal to the evidence: for a truth unable to be so justified is to the 
historian a thing of no interest’ (1993: 246). 
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